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Abstract
The paper analyzes how international outsourcing a®ected individual employment
security. The analysis is carried out at the micro-level, combining monthly spell data
from household panel data and industry-level outsourcing measures. By utilizing
micro-level data, problems such as aggregation and potential endogeneity bias, as
well as crude skill approximations that regularly hamper industry level displacement
studies, can be reduced considerably. The main ¯nding is that international
outsourcing signi¯cantly lowers individual employment security. Interestingly, the
e®ect does, however, not di®er between high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers but
only varies with job duration.
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11 Introduction
International outsourcing and its alleged negative labor market e®ects are raising
increasing public concern, especially against the backdrop of the EU's eastern en-
largement. In the public debate, the predominant view appears to be that interna-
tional outsourcing severely threatens domestic employment security particulary for
low-skilled workers, a view supported largely by anecdotal evidence. However, in the
academic literature it is far from consensual what the concrete labor market impacts
of international outsourcing actually are.
This study focuses on the German labor market, which is an interesting case,
being not only the largest economy in Europe, but also far more open to international
trade than, for instance, the US. Furthermore, political and economic transition in the
formerly communist Central and Eastern European countries during the 1990s now
allows for intensive production-sharing with these economies at Germany's doorstep,
with potentially sweeping implications for the German labor market.
Over recent years, a number of theoretical contributions such as Feenstra and Han-
son (1996a), Arndt (1997, 1999), Deardor® (2001, 2002), Jones and Kierzkowski (2001)
and Kohler(2004), to mention only a few, have highlighted the importance of interna-
tional outsourcing for determining labor demand for di®erent skill groups. However,
the theoretical literature is not conclusive with regard to the labor market e®ects of
international outsourcing. Depending on the models' assumptions and framework,
international outsourcing can raise or lower relative demand for low-skilled workers.
Furthermore, all of the aforementioned models assume that labor market adjust-
ments are achieved by su±ciently °exible wages. Although this may be justi¯able in
the long run, in the medium and short run, especially in a country such as Germany,
wages might be fairly rigid. If this is the case, then labor market adjustments to inter-
national outsourcing have to be achieved mainly through changes in employment (see
Krugman, 1995). At the same time, the aforementioned models generally abstract
from adjustment costs, thus labour can move costlessly between di®erent areas of eco-
nomic activity in response to international outsourcing. However, as authors such as
Davidson and Matusz (2004) convincingly show, if displaced workers experience spells
of unemployment and in some cases have to be re-trained, short-run adjustment costs
can consume a signi¯cant part of the overall gains from international trade. Accord-
ingly, albeit unquestioned e±ciency gains, what also matters for the welfare e®ects
of international outsourcing is how, and how fast the labour force adjust to changing
patterns of international specialisation. The focus of the present paper is therefore on
the impact of international outsourcing on the short run labour markets dynamics.
More speci¯cally, the paper will address the questions of how international outsourcing
2a®ects the individual risk of leaving employment and of how the impact of outsourcing
may vary with skill and employment duration.
Section 2 provides some descriptive analysis on the development of employment
security, discusses the de¯nition of international outsourcing and its measurement and
gives a summary of recent developments. Section 3 gives a short overview of the pre-
vious literature on labor market e®ects of international outsourcing. The empirical
hazard rate model is introduced in Section 4, and Section 5 describes the data set and
the empirical strategy. Section 6 gives a detailed description of the empirical results for
various model speci¯cations. Section 7 summarizes and discusses the ¯ndings in rela-
tion to the literature. The general ¯ndings are that international outsourcing, de¯ned
in a strict, narrow sense, signi¯cantly raises the individual risk of leaving employment.
However, there are no statistically signi¯cant di®erences in the impact of international
outsourcing across skill groups. However, irrespective of educational attainment the
outsourcing related risk of leaving employment increases with employment duration.
2 Descriptive Analysis
Table 1 shows calculations based on data from the German Socio Economic Panel
(GSOEP) of how employment security of manufacturing employees has developed
over the 1990s.1 While over all individuals in 1991 the unconditional risk of leaving
employment was 0.79 percent it increased by about 100% to 1.59 percent in 2000.
Furthermore, it becomes apparent that the risk of leaving employment grew for all
skill-groups, with particularly steep increases for medium and high-skilled workers.
This development is also re°ected in individually reported fear of job loss. In the
GSOEP respondents each year are asked how worried they are to to loose their present
job over the next year. Table 2 presents summary statistics for di®erent categories of
worry.2 When pooling over all skill groups the share of respondents that is not worried
at all about the prospects of losing the present job has been declining sharply from
51% to 34% which is mirrored in a signi¯cant increase of the share of respondents that
are somewhat or very worried. Again, this development is not con¯ned to only one
skill-group but can be observed across high, medium and low-skilled workers alike.
Obviously, the fear of job loss not only depends on the probability of losing a job but
1The ¯gures are calculated using monthly employment data for prime age males and females in the
manufacturing industry, the sample is identical with the one used in the econometric analysis in Section 6.
2Naturally, it is di±cult to compare these worry scores across individuals. To ensure comparability of
these scores over time, calculations are based on a balanced sample of 418 individuals in manufacturing
employment. Thus, changes in the distribution of the di®erent worry categories have to be due to changes
in the individual fear of job loss.
3e.g., also one the prospects of ¯nding a new job after displacement or the generosity
of the unemployment insurance scheme. Whatever the underlying reasons are, these
¯gures, however, clearly correspond to a considerable increase in individually perceived
insecurity.
To clarify to what extent international outsourcing may be indeed responsible for
decreased objective employment security, one ¯rst has to quantify international out-
sourcing which presents a challenge. Authors such as Yeats (1998) seek to measure
international outsourcing by directly quantifying trade with intermediate goods, as-
sessing the intermediate character of the traded goods on the basis of disaggregated
goods classi¯cations. Imported parts and components are assumed to be intermediate
goods imports of the broader industry that produces them. This procedure abstracts
from the possibility that parts and components from one industry can also be used by
other industries or by ¯nal consumers, thus biasing the measurement.
Other authors such as Campa and Goldberg (1997) and Feenstra and Hanson
(1999) quantify international outsourcing by combining input coe±cients found in
input-output tables and trade data. The estimated value of imported intermediate
inputs of an industry thereby largely depends on whether one applies a narrow or
wide de¯nition of international outsourcing. Campa and Goldberg (1997) and others
assume that the total sum of imported intermediate goods in each industry repre-
sents a reasonable indicator for international outsourcing. But according to Feenstra
and Hanson (1999) this \de¯nition" might be too broad if one understands interna-
tional outsourcing as the result of a make-or-buy decision. Following this approach,
not the total sum of imported intermediate inputs but only the part that could be
produced within the respective domestic industry corresponds to international out-
sourcing. However, depending on the aggregational level, the range of products that
an industry can produce varies. Accordingly, the more highly aggregated the indus-
tries, the broader the de¯nition of international outsourcing that is applied to them.
We construct two measures of international outsourcing that largely follow the
concepts proposed in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) and Feenstra and Hanson (1996a).
International outsourcing is de¯ned as the shift of a two-digit industry's core activities
abroad, represented by the value of the industry's imported intermediate inputs from
the same industry abroad as a share of the domestic industry's production value. The
challenge is now to measure the respective industry's imports of intermediate goods. A
simple procedure would be to assume that all imports from a certain industry abroad
are directed towards the respective domestic industry and nowhere else. Essentially
this would amount to the construction of industry-level import penetration ratios
which are, however, rather poor measures of industries' outsourcing activities. Instead







with Impi¤t denoting imported intermediate inputs from industry i¤ and Yit the
production value of industry i at time t. ­ii¤t denotes the share of imports from
industry i¤ abroad that is consumed by the domestic industry i in t with
PI
i=1 ­ii¤t£
IMPi¤t =total imports from industry i¤ that is used in agriculture, manufacturing,
services, private and public consumption, investment and exports in t.
Loosening the concept of an industry's core activities, wide outsourcing is some-
what less conservatively de¯ned as a two-digit industry's purchase of intermediate
goods from abroad represented by the respective industry's sum of imported inter-
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Figure 1 shows the development of international outsourcing for the manufacturing
industry as a whole. In general, international outsourcing has grown substantially over
recent years. Naturally, wide outsourcing is at a higher level than narrow outsourcing.
However, one has to bare in mind that the level of international outsourcing is only
secondary. It is the development of outsourcing over time that indicates important
underlying structural changes.3 As can be seen, narrowly de¯ned, international out-
sourcing (as in Equation 1) increased signi¯cantly by around 2.28 percentage points or
46 percent between 1991 and 2000 while, broadly de¯ned, outsourcing (as in Equation
2) increased by around 35 percent or 4.2 percentage points.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of international outsourcing in two-digit NACE in-
dustries. Even though international outsourcing di®ers widely in importance for the
separate industries and the dynamic patterns vary considerably, almost every manu-
facturing industry shows signi¯cant growth in its outsourcing intensity.
In a ¯rst analytic step one can now relate the change in industry-level outsourcing
to industry-level employment security. As becomes evident in Figure 3 one can observe
a positive correlation between changes in international outsourcing and the individual
risk of leaving employment in 15 out of 21 industries. However, such an analysis needs
to be considerably re¯ned to establish any causal relationship between international
outsourcing and employment security.
3Accordingly, in the econometric analysis presented in Section 6 the e®ects of international outsourcing
are only identi¯ed through changes over time as the model includes industry ¯xed e®ects.
53 Previous Literature
There exist numerous contributions that empirically analyze the labor market impact
of international competition in general (e.g., Revenga, 1992; Sachs and Shatz, 1994 and
Greenaway, Hine and Wright, 1999) and more speci¯cally international outsourcing
(e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996, 1999; Hsieh and Woo, 2005; Falk and Koebel, 2002;
Geishecker, 2006; Ekholm and Hakkala, 2005). However, while the aforementioned
studies can quantify the aggregated demand e®ects of outsourcing the dynamics behind
that process remain in the dark.
Authors such as Davidson and Matusz (2005), Klein, Schuh and Triest (2003)
and Kletzer (2004) highlight the relevance of export orientation and international
competition as determinants of job creation and job destruction. However, the role of
international outsourcing for labor market dynamics has remained largely unaddressed
in the literature. Exceptional in this respect are the contributions of Kletzer (2000),
Egger, Pfa®ermayr and Weber (2006) and Munch (2005).
Kletzer (2000) calculates industry-level displacement rates from the Displaced
Workers Survey and regresses them on changes in exports, import penetration and
imported intermediate goods, which arguably correspond to international outsourc-
ing. While the author ¯nds overall import penetration to signi¯cantly raise industry
displacement rates, imports of intermediate goods are rendered insigni¯cant. How-
ever, industry-level results can be severely biased due to the use of aggregated data
which impedes controlling for important compositional changes e.g. in the gender or
education structure of employment. Furthermore, most industry-level studies assume
international outsourcing to be exogenous to labour demand, an assumption that is
rarely tested. If international outsourcing is, however, jointly determined with the
demand for labour, estimated coe±cients su®er from endogeneity bias.
Egger et al. (2006) therefore assess the e®ects of international outsourcing for the
transition probabilities of employment utilizing a random sample of Austrian social
security data. By doing so the e®ects of international outsourcing can be assessed
at the individual level avoiding aggregation bias and considerably reducing poten-
tial endogeneity bias as individual characteristics are unlikely to a®ect industry-level
aggregates. To control for unobserved individual heterogeneity the authors chose a
¯xed e®ects speci¯cation applying the estimator proposed by Honor¶ e and Kyriazidou
(2000). Although such a ¯xed e®ects speci¯cation has the clear advantage that no
assumptions about the correlation between the unobserved component and the indi-
vidual time varying variables have to be made, the estimator proposed by Honor¶ e
and Kyriazidou (2000) does not allow to compute the probabilities of the transition
matrix since no constant can be estimated. The results of Egger et al. (2006) suggest
6that international outsourcing signi¯cantly reduces the probability of transition into
the manufacturing sector, at least into that part of manufacturing that has a revealed
comparative disadvantage and, thus, is more a®ected by international competition.
However, as the authors do not control for time-changing individual characteristics
other than age, it would be interesting to see whether these results are robust to a less
parsimonious model speci¯cation. More recently, Munch (2005) analyses the impact of
industry-level international outsourcing on job separations using yearly data for a ten
percent sub-sample of the Danish population within an employment duration model.
Estimating a single risk model, his general ¯nding is that international outsourcing, at
least when broadly de¯ned, has a signi¯cant but small impact on individual job sepa-
ration risks. Estimating a competing risk model and di®erentiating between exit into
unemployment and changing jobs, he ¯nds that international outsourcing increases
the risk of becoming unemployed, but that the e®ect is only statistically signi¯cant
for low-skilled workers. For high-skilled workers, international outsourcing increases
the probability of changing jobs, but has no signi¯cant e®ect on the individual hazard
of becoming unemployed.
To the best knowledge of the author the present study is the ¯rst empirical analysis
of the impact of international outsourcing on employment security for the German
labour market. It builds on the contributions of Egger et al. (2006) and Munch
(2005) but departs in several important ways. First of all, instead of looking at
year to year transitions we use monthly employment data. This allows us to more
comprehensively control for the duration dependence of employment loss by taking also
short term employment spells into account. Furthermore, we control for a wider range
of time changing individual and work-place related characteristics and also include
industry and region ¯xed e®ects to capture unobserved characteristics thereby avoiding
potential endogeneity bias.
4 Modelling employment duration
The present study utilizes a large sample of monthly spell data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the years 1991 to 2000.4 Although employment
transitions can in principle occur in continuous time, in the data one can only observe
monthly spells. Accordingly, a discrete time hazard model is speci¯ed. The data
allow us to estimate employment transitions on a monthly basis and provides a wide
array of individual characteristics to control for individual heterogeneity. Nevertheless,
unobserved characteristics might be important, resulting in a misspeci¯ed model with
4The choice of the sample period is determined by the availability of input-output data to construct
the outsourcing measure.
7omitted regressors. Not accounting for this problem potentially yields biased estimates
of the duration dependence and the proportionate response of the hazard with respect
to other regressors.5 We control for unobserved heterogeneity following Heckman and
Singer (1984) and allow for an unobserved individual e®ect that is assumed to follow
an arbitrary discrete distribution.6
Furthermore, accounting for duration dependence is essential, as one would expect
employment insecurity to typically decline with job duration as employees accumulate
¯rm-speci¯c human capital.7 Also, other factors such as labor market institutions that
result in lower relative employment protection for employees with short tenure play a
role. However, as to the exact functional form that duration dependence takes, little
can be known a priori. Accordingly, a semi-parametric characterization of duration
dependence is chosen. The underlying assumption is that for each respondent, the
hazard rate is constant within a speci¯ed time interval, but there are no further
constraints on the functional form of the hazard.
Formally the individual i discrete time hazard rate of leaving employment is de¯ned
as the probability of exit in the interval (t¡1; t) conditional upon survival until t¡1:
¸i(Xit;°it;²m
i ) = Pr(t ¡ 1 < T · tj T ¸ t ¡ 1;Xit;°it;²m
i ) (3)
where Xi denotes a vector of individual characteristics and °it describes set of in-
terval dummies for employment duration. Furthermore, ²m
i denotes a time-invariant
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i ;Xit) = 0 (6)
One can denote the individual probability of leaving employment in period t in
terms of the hazard function as:
Pr(T = tjXit;°it;²m






5However, as authors such as Dolton and von der Klaauw (1995) show, ignoring unobserved hetero-
geneity results in severe biases when an incorrect functional form for the baseline hazard is chosen. With
a °exible characterization of duration dependence, as is applied in this study, ignoring or misspecifying
unobserved heterogeneity has almost no consequences.
6The availability of repeated spell observations in our sample in principle would also allow for a ¯xed
e®ects treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. However, as the number of repeated out of employment
transitions is very small in our sample ¯xed e®ects are not appropriate as the parameters cannot be
identi¯ed.
7See Farber, 1999 for a discussion.
8Choosing a complementary log-log representation of the hazard rate:
¸i(Xit;°it;²m
i ) = 1 ¡ exp(¡exp(¯0Xit + °it + ²m
i )) (8)
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with ci = 1 if the employment spell of individual i is completed and ci = 0 if it is
censored.
Now one can also write down the likelihood function that is to be maximized.
However, since we want to explicitly allow for repeated spells by individuals, one
additional integration step is required. If we let k denote the number of employment
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denotes the overall likelihood function.
5 Empirical strategy and data
The empirical analysis is based on stock-sampled monthly individual-level spell data
from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) for the period 1991 to 2000. The
sample is restricted to prime-age (18 to 65 years) respondents who worked in manu-
facturing (NACE sectors 15-36) at least once during the sample period.8
In every wave, respondents are asked to give a record of their monthly work status
during the previous year. Prede¯ned categories are full and part-time work, unem-
ployment, housework, maternity leave, military service, education or pension. Due
to the retrospective nature of the question and related recollection errors, the data
might be considerably noisy. Furthermore, workplace-related characteristics are only
collected once a year, adding considerable measurement error if an individual has more
than one employment spell per year. There is, however, no reason to believe that this
process is non-random, at least not after one controls for individual heterogeneity.
Thus, one can derive consistent estimates. The data are reorganized as person-period
data to foster easy estimation methods, as discussed in Allison (1982) and Jenkins
(1995) yielding a total of 213750 monthly observations for 5431 individuals.
8In order to avoid selection bias with respect to item non-response, each explanatory variable is sup-
plemented with a dummy for missing values and subsequently recoded to zero.
9An inevitable aspect of stock sampling is left truncation of ongoing employment
spells. The sample period for observing employment duration starts in 1991.9 Natu-
rally, many respondents had already been in continuous employment for some time at
that date. Similarly, new respondents that later enter the sample might already have
been in employment for a considerable time. Fortunately, the GSOEP provides infor-
mation about the employment history of each individual. One can therefore derive
the duration of current employment spells even if they started before 1991 or even
before 1984, the ¯rst wave of the GSOEP, and correct for left truncation by adjusting
the employment duration parameters °it in Equation 10 upwards.
The focus of this work lies on work-to-non-employment transitions. An employ-
ment spell ends if the respondent ceases to work and reports having become unem-
ployed or engages in housework. Unfortunately, the data do not provide information
on job-to-job transitions, at least not on a monthly basis. Employment spells that end
for other reasons, i.e education, military service, pension, maternity leave or transition
into non-manufacturing employment, are censored. The same is true if the respondent
drops out of the sample or the sample period ends. Due to the longitudinal character
of the data, respondents can have many di®erent employment spells.
Duration dependence is captured by a set of dummies °it that are de¯ned for
employment durations of 1 to 6 months (DD : 0 ¡ 6), 7 to 12 months (DD : 7 ¡ 12),
13 to 36 months (DD : 13 ¡ 36), 37 to 96 months (DD : 37 ¡ 96) and more than 97
months (DD :> 97).
We control for a wide range of time-changing and constant individual, workplace
and region-related characteristics. The choice of control variables included builds on
a large body of literature that analyzes job turnover (e.g. Royalty, 1998; Zavodny,
2003, Farber, 1999, Kletzer, 1998 and Farber, 2005). Accordingly, the vector Xit
in Equation 10 consists of a set of basic demographic controls, occupational place-
ment, work place characteristics, individual skills and region and industry speci¯c
controls. The de¯nition of skills is based on internationally comparable information
following the International Standard Classi¯cation of Education (ISCED) as described
in UNESCO (1997). The data make it possible to di®erentiate among respondents
according to their educational attainment as follows: (1) primary education, (2) lower
secondary education or second stage of basic education, (3) secondary education, (4)
post-secondary non-tertiary education, (5) ¯rst stage of tertiary education or (6) sec-
ond stage of tertiary education. In line with ISCED, low-skilled workers (ED : low)
are de¯ned as individuals with primary education, lower secondary, or the second
9The choice of 1991 as the beginning of the sample period is driven by the availability of NACE two-digit
input-output data.
10stage of basic education. Medium-skilled (ED : med) workers are individuals with
upper secondary education, post-secondary non-tertiary education, or the ¯rst stage
of tertiary education. High-skilled workers (ED : high) are de¯ned as individuals with
some form of the second stage of tertiary education.
We do not explicitly control for the frequency and duration of past employment
spells. As our set of individual control variables already is fairly comprehensive includ-
ing such additional controls, which are essentially determined by our other explanatory
variables (e.g., education), would give rise to multicolinearity and does not improve
the model.
An essential part of the analysis is to merge individual-level data with two-digit
industry-level information on outsourcing intensity and other industry characteristics.
International outsourcing (OUTS) is constructed by combining input-output data that
are available from the German Statistical O±ce (Fachserie 18, Reihe 2) and OECD
International Commodity Trade Statistics, which was aggregated from ¯ve-digit SITC
trade ¯gures to the two-digit NACE level applying the concordance table provided by
Eurostat.
To capture the e®ects of technological change, industry research and development
expenditure as a share of industry output is included in the model ( R&D
Y ). Research
and development (R&D) expenditure is only a crude measure of technological change.
However, it is commonly used in the literature (e.g., Berman, Bound and Griliches
and Machin and Van Reenen, 1998) and alternative proxies of technological change are
not available for Germany. Data on industry research and development expenditure
are provided by the OECD ANBERD database.10
Industry-level studies by authors such as Davidson and Matusz (2005), Klein et al.
(2003) Kletzer (2000) and Kletzer (2004) highlight the relevance of export orientation
and international competition as determinants of job creation and job destruction.
Accordingly, a measure of net exports is included in the model: Exp ¡ Imp. Again,
data on exports and imports are derived from the OECD Commodity Trade Statistics.
In addition to international outsourcing, technological change and net exports, the




Y ) to control for time-varying industry characteristics. Data
on industry output and capital were provided by the German Statistical O±ce.
Furthermore, we control for unobserved region and industry speci¯c heterogeneity
by including a set of industry and region dummies. Accordingly, our outsourcing
parameter is only identi¯ed trough changes in an industry's outsourcing intensity.
10Unfortunately, prior to 1995, research and development expenditure is not available at the NACE
two-digit level. Missing values are therefore imputed by regressing available data from 1995 to 2003 on a
linear trend for each industry.
11Together with our time varying ¯rm level variables (e.g., ¯rm size), industry and
region dummies should ensure that our outsourcing coe±cient is not merely a result
of ¯rm or industry speci¯c unobservable characteristics that are correlated with the
outsourcing measure.11
A comprehensive list of our control variables with corresponding summary statistics
is reported in Table 3.
Combining micro-level and more aggregated industry-level data could give rise to
contemporaneous correlation in the error terms and thus result in biased standard
errors. Within the context of linear models, this problem has been stressed forcefully
by Moulton (1986, 1990). He suggests addressing the issue by multiplying the standard
errors with a common factor that re°ects the average intra-cluster residual correlation.
However, as authors such as Angrist and Lavy (2002) stress, the equi-correlated error
structure imposed by this method is inappropriate in the context of models with binary
outcomes and suggest to apply the Generalised Estimation method (GEE) instead.
Again the idea is to multiply the standard errors by a factor re°ecting the intra cluster
residual correlation, which is, however, allowed to vary between clusters. The main
problem with such an approach is that it is only valid if the number of clusters is large
relative to the number of within cluster observations (See e.g. Wooldridge, 2002, Ch.
11 for a discussion.) casting doubt on the applicability within our model. However,
through the inclusion of industry and region dummies one can considerably reduce
contemporaneous correlation in the residual as the residual correlation within clusters
due to time constant unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for. Nevertheless, we
recognise that the standard errors are still potentially biased as we fail to correct
for potential serial correlation within clusters. We therefore present bootstrapped
standard errors in Table 7 to show the robustness of our ¯ndings with respect to
within cluster serial correlation.12
11Obviously, an estimation with ¯rm-level ¯xed e®ects would be desirable but would require matched
employer-employee data with a su±cient number of out-o® employment transitions by ¯rm.
12Following Greene (2000) we can calculate the standard errors of the estimated parameters according
to following formula:













where R denotes the number of repetitions (500), b
cloglog
r the vector of parameter estimates from the rth
regression based on the random sample of 10100 individual spells and b
cloglog the vector of parameter
estimates for the cloglog model based on the full original sample.
126 Estimation and results
Column I of Table 4 presents the results of a simple cloglog hazard rate model as
a benchmark abstracting from individual unobserved heterogeneity. To control for
unobserved heterogeneity we start by estimating Equation 10 with two mass points and
subsequently add additional masses holding all parameters constant at their previous
maximum-likelihood levels until the log-likelihood fails to increase signi¯cantly. The
parameter estimates of the fully speci¯ed model as in Equation 10 with four mass
points are presented in Column II of Table 4.13
Generally, the estimated coe±cients have the expected signs and the model param-
eters of the simple cloglog model are notably close to the estimates of the fully speci¯ed
model. In both speci¯cations the hazard of exiting employment is largest within the
¯rst six months, probably re°ecting German legislation that allows for a probationary
period of up to six months. After that, the hazard of exiting employment monoton-
ically declines with employment duration, con¯rming Farber (1999).14 Furthermore,
the hazard of exiting employment increases with age, however, not linearly and de-
creases with higher educational attainment. Women face a signi¯cantly higher risk
of leaving employment than men. In line with the ¯ndings of Beeson Royalty (1998)
having children in the household and marital status have a signi¯cantly di®erent im-
pact on men and women as the statistically signi¯cant coe±cients of the interaction
terms indicate. Accordingly, women with children face a signi¯cantly higher risk of
leaving employment than men with children. Furthermore, men have a signi¯cantly
lower probability of leaving employment when married while for women the opposite
is true.
Firm size is found to be positively related to employment security which is in
line with G¶ omez-Salvador, Messina and Vallanti (2004). Public ownership, however
has no signi¯cant impact on individual employment security. Furthermore higher
occupational placement has no clear impact on employment security. After controlling
for unobserved heterogeneity we only ¯nd negative signi¯cant coe±cients for clerks
and crafts workers.
In the literature, job turnover models sometimes include a wage variable (e.g.,
Beeson Royalty, 1998). It is, however, questionable whether wages can be considered
exogenous in the kind of model applied here. Furthermore, all determinants that are
included to explain individual employment loss would also be standard control vari-
ables in a wage regression. However, wages can be a powerful predictor of unobserved
13All mass point models are estimated using the GLLAMM module for Stata as described in Raabe-
Hesketh and Everitt (2004).
14Note that Farber (1999) is concerned with job duration as opposed to employment duration. The line
of argument, however, still applies.
13individual characteristics, which supports their inclusion in the model. We acknowl-
edge the potential endogeneity of wages in such a setting but estimate speci¯cations
including and excluding wages for comparison.15 Hourly wages are found to signi¯-
cantly lower the probability of leaving employment. The same is true for the dummy
variable for missing wages, indicating a negative relationship between non-reporting
of wages and employment insecurity. However, a comparison between the estimates
in Column III and II of Table 4 reveals that excluding wages from the model results
in only modest parameter alterations.16
Regarding the regional and industry-level variables, regional unemployment, ceteris
paribus, is found to signi¯cantly raise the risk of leaving employment at least after
one controls for unobserved heterogeneity.17 Furthermore, technological progress, as
captured by industry-level research and development expenditure, appears to be an
important factor shaping individual employment security regardless of whether or
not one controls for unobserved heterogeneity.18 With regard to net exports, we
¯nd no support for the ¯ndings of industry-level studies for the US by authors such
as Kletzer (2000) and most notably Davidson and Matusz (2005) at least after we
control for unobserved individual heterogeneity. With regard to the industry-level
capital intensity, only capital in the form of plant is found to increases employment
security. Regarding industry output, the coe±cient is negative and weakly signi¯cant
and the overall marginal e®ect is negative.19
For this analysis, the most interesting variable is, of course international out-
sourcing (OUTS). All model speci¯cations reported in Table 4 yield a positive and
highly signi¯cant coe±cient which is fairly similar in size independent of whether
one controls for unobserved heterogeneity or one excludes wages from the regressors.
Ceteris paribus, a one percentage point increase in an industry's outsourcing inten-
sity increases the hazard of leaving employment by about six percent (Simple model:
exp(0:059) ¡ 1 = 0:061, Full model:exp(0:054) ¡ 1 = 0:055). Thus, industry level in-
15To prevent estimation bias due to item non-response we included a dummy variable for missing wages
as a regressor and recoded missing wages to zero.
16One notable di®erence exists with respect to educational attainment and occupational placement which
are standard control variables in any wage regression, and are typically highly correlated with wages.
17Our results are therefore is in line with earlier ¯ndings of Zavodny (2003) for involuntary job separations
in the US.
18Zavodny (2003) ¯nds that in the US technology, measured by computer usage, is negatively related to
job separation. However, this result is driven by voluntary job separations. Involuntary job separations in
manufacturing are positively related to technology.
19Looking at the fully speci¯ed model the coe±cients on output and capital intensity are negative and
the coe±cients on R&D=Y and OUTS are positive and signi¯cant. The partial deviations of R&D=Y
and OUTS with respect to Y are, however, negative. Thus, increases in industry output raise individual
employment security.
14ternational outsourcing is indeed an important determinant of individual employment
security.
In order to assess the extent to which international outsourcing a®ects employment
security for di®erent skill groups and whether there are signi¯cant di®erences between
them, international outsourcing and education are interacted.20 Similarly, we loosen
the poolability constraint on R&D=Y to allow for skill-speci¯c di®erences in the im-
pact of technological change. Column IV of Table 4 presents the coe±cient estimates
for this speci¯cation. Again, technological progress results in reduced employment
security, the e®ect is however only statistically signi¯cant for medium- and low-skilled
workers. With regard to outsourcing the respective coe±cients are positive and statis-
tically signi¯cant for all skill groups. The e®ect of international outsourcing appears
to be strongest for medium-skilled followed by high-skilled workers. However, when
testing for the signi¯cance of parameter di®erences, Wald and likelihood ratio tests in-
dicate that one cannot reject teh pooled model within reasonable con¯dence bounds.21
Accordingly, the e®ects of international outsourcing and technological progress do not
di®er signi¯cantly between skill groups.22
In addition, the model is estimated using the somewhat less conservative wide
de¯nition of international outsourcing as in Equation 2. Applying the wide de¯ni-
tion, international outsourcing is rendered insigni¯cant (Column I of Table 5). When
interacting outsourcing with skill, we ¯nd a signi¯cant positive coe±cients for medium-
skilled workers. However, as the likelihood ratio test statistics in Column II of Table 5
indicates, we again cannot reject the pooled model.
Overall, the support for a signi¯cant role of broadly de¯ned outsourcing is much
weaker than that for narrowly de¯ned outsourcing. The diverging results highlight
the importance of precisely de¯ning the outsourcing phenomenon. As has been dis-
cussed previously in Section 2, narrowly de¯ned, outsourcing can be understood as
the outcome of a make or buy decision. Wide outsourcing, however, encapsulates all
intermediate goods imports of an industry and therefore may be less correlated with
an industry's outsourcing activities explaining the lower statistical signi¯cance in the
model.
To ease the interpretation of the estimated coe±cients and to assess the economic
20Preferably, one would estimate the model separately for sub-samples of di®erent skill groups in order
to loosen poolability constraints. Unfortunately, the number of employment exits is too low to identify the
model parameters for smaller sub-samples.
21The Wald test is based on a quadratic approximation of the likelihood function and therefore less
precise than the likelihood ratio test.
22To assess the robustness of the above results, the model was also estimated interacting gender, ed-
ucation and outsourcing. However, the impact of international outsourcing does not di®er markedly by
gender.
15relevance, one can simulate the e®ect of international outsourcing on the employment
hazard over the sample period. Focusing on narrowly de¯ned international outsourc-
ing, we know from Figure 1 that it increased by 2.28 percentage points between 1991
and 2000. Accordingly, using the coe±cients from Column II in Table 4 the model
predicts that between 1991 and 2000 international outsourcing increased the hazard
of existing employment by approximately 13 percent (exp(0:054 ¤ 2:28) ¡ 1 = 0:131).
In comparison the e®ects of technological progress, at least as captured by R&D
expenditures, are fairly modest. Between 1991 and 2000 research and development
expenditure as a share of aggregate output increased from 2.58 percent to 2.64 per-
cent. Accordingly, technological progress raises the hazard of leaving employment by
less than one percent (exp(0:140 ¤ 0:06) ¡ 1 = 0:00844).
In a next step it is interesting to assess how the impact of international outsourc-
ing varies with employment duration shedding light on the role of unobserved ¯rm
speci¯c human capital for mitigating the e®ects of outsourcing. In order to address
this issue we simply interact international outsourcing with the duration dummies and
re-estimate the model. Table 6 presents the outcome of this exercise for the simple
cloglog and the fully speci¯ed model. In both models the negative impact of inter-
national outsourcing on individual employment security appears to increases with job
duration. However, as the likelihood ratio test in Table 6 indicates, in the fully speci-
¯ed model that controls for unobserved heterogeneity we can reject the hypothesis of a
uniform impact of international outsourcing over employment duration within reason-
able con¯dence bounds.23 While the general risk of leaving employment declines with
employment duration which is in line with the idea that over time workers accumulate
¯rm-speci¯c capital (see Farber, 1999), the speci¯c impact of international outsourcing
follows a di®erent pattern with positive instead of negative duration dependence. We
interpret this result as evidence that international outsourcing represents a substan-
tial technological change that leads to a devaluation of ¯rm-speci¯c human capital.
Workers then face a situation in which their previous human capital wage premiums
are not longer sustainable. In this scenario longer tenured, more experienced workers
may be more a®ected since the discrepancy between the wage that is sustainable under
the outsourcing regime and the previous human capital wage premium is particularly
large. Accordingly, if wages do not adjust downwards, longer tenured workers are more
likely to exit employment due to international outsourcing. To what extent existing
German labour market institutions constitute an obstacle to required wage cuts is an
23Strictly speaking the standard errors of the interaction parameter estimates could be biased downwards
due to within cluster serial correlation as previously discussed. However, when interacting duration dum-
mies and industry level outsourcing the clusters become much smaller which arguably reduces potential
distortions in the standard errors.
16interesting question for further research.
7 Discussion
The paper expands the existing literature by analyzing the e®ects of international
outsourcing for individual employment security in a micro-econometric framework
utilizing a large panel of individual monthly employment spell data and controlling
for the duration dependence of employment security. The approach is suitable to con-
siderably reduce the aggregation and potential endogeneity bias that hampers existing
industry-level displacement studies. Furthermore, individual-level data are arguably
better suited to describe individual skills than the manual vs. non-manual worker skill
approximation that is commonly used in the literature.
Our main ¯ndings are that workers with less than seven months of employment
duration face the highest risk of leaving employment. Afterwards, employment secu-
rity monotonically increases over time. Furthermore, international outsourcing, when
narrowly de¯ned, is found to have a marked impact on individual employment secu-
rity. Remarkably, the e®ect does not di®er statistically between high-, medium- and
low-skilled workers. This is an interesting result as it poses a contrast to the ¯ndings of
industry-level studies that typically identify low-skilled workers to be more adversely
e®ected than high skilled workers by outsourcing (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson, 1996;
Egger and Egger, 2003).24 Similarly, with regard to technological progress we ¯nd
only uniform negative e®ects for individual employment security across di®erent skill
groups. At ¯rst sight this stark discrepancy between industry-level ¯ndings on rela-
tive employment e®ects of international outsourcing and technological change and our
micro-level results is puzzling. However, while industry-level studies are concerned
with partial equilibrium net e®ects we look at the dynamics of the adjustment process
in response to international outsourcing (an technological change). Authors such as
Swaim and Podgursky (1989) and Farber (1997) show that the probability of ¯nding
reemployment is increasing in the level of educational attainment. A ¯nding that is
also con¯rmed for Germany by authors such as Hunt (1995), Steiner (2001) and Uh-
lendor® (2004). This suggests that the skill-biased e®ects of technological change and
international outsourcing that have been found for Germany in aggregated industry-
level studies (e.g.,Falk and Koebel, 2002; Geishecker, 2006) are indirect and related
to the lower probability of low-skilled workers to reenter employment.
In addition, we ¯nd evidence that the impact of international outsourcing varies
with employment duration. While we estimate a negative general duration depen-
24An exception is Ekholm and Hakkala (2005) for Sweden who ¯nd medium-skilled workers to most
adversly a®ected by international outsourcing.
17dence we ¯nd some evidence that the speci¯c e®ect of international outsourcing is
characterized by positive duration dependence. Thus the risk of leaving employment
due to outsourcing increases with employment duration. Although our model is not
suited to address this issue directly, this is in line with the idea that international
outsourcing represents a major technological shift that leads to a devaluation of ¯rm-
speci¯c human capital. Accordingly, the previous human capital wage premium may
not be sustainable which is particularly relevant for more experienced, longer tenured
workers.
Finally, it is important to stress that the present analysis only focuses on one side
of the labour market adjustment process, namely on out of employment transitions.
While we can provide evidence that outsourcing uniformly raises the risk of leaving
employment, the number of reported transitions in the GSOEP data are to small to
analyse whether outsourcing also has a direct e®ect on the probability of re-entering
employment. As has been previously discussed, low-skilled workers face a signi¯cantly
lower probability of re-entering employment. However, to what extent this lower
probability is determined by international outsourcing remains an open question for
future research. Ideally, a future study would employ a much larger micro-level data
set, such as the social insurance sample provided by the Institut fÄ ur Arbeitsmarkt
und Berufsforschung (IAB) to analyse out-o® employment and out-o® unemployment
transitions simultaneously.
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22Figures and Tables
Table 1: Risk of existing employment over time in %
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total
Pooled over all skill groups 0.79 1.07 1.2 1.01 1.18 1.22 1.29 1.18 1.36 1.58 1.2
High-Skilled 0.21 0.58 0.26 0.20 0.69 0.45 0.38 0.25 0.25 1.03 0.49
Medium-Skilled 0.25 0.76 0.70 0.78 0.66 0.74 0.99 1.01 1.34 0.99 0.84
Low-Skilled 0.96 1.20 1.42 1.19 1.37 1.46 1.54 1.40 1.59 1.85 1.39
Number of observations 24,445 22,451 20,362 19,792 20,465 18,940 18,309 19,832 19,400 29,754 213,750
Table 2: Individually reported concern to lose job within the next year, shares in %
Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All Skill Groups
Very Concerned 13.4 14.35 16.03 21.29 14.59 13.4 21.53 16.03 13.4 15.07
Somewhat Concerned 35.17 46.41 49.52 51.91 50.72 51.67 50.96 49.04 53.83 50.48
Not Concerned At All 51.44 39.23 34.45 26.79 34.69 34.93 27.51 34.93 32.78 34.45
High-Skilled
Very Concerned 15.00 11.67 16.67 18.33 10.00 10.00 13.33 10.00 13.33 16.05
Somewhat Concerned 23.33 40.00 50.00 55.00 46.67 50.00 58.33 53.33 48.33 46.91
Not Concerned At All 61.67 48.33 33.33 26.67 43.33 40.00 28.33 36.67 38.33 37.04
Medium-Skilled
Very Concerned 15.52 16.95 13.56 27.12 19.67 12.70 24.19 22.58 11.11 14.04
Somewhat Concerned 32.76 52.54 52.54 44.07 52.46 57.14 43.55 40.32 53.97 56.14
Not Concerned At All 51.72 30.51 33.90 28.81 27.87 30.16 32.26 37.10 34.92 29.82
Low-Skilled
Very Concerned 12.67 14.38 16.39 20.74 14.48 14.24 22.64 15.88 13.90 15.00
Somewhat Concerned 38.00 46.49 48.83 52.84 51.18 50.85 51.01 50.00 54.92 50.36
Not Concerned At All 49.33 39.13 34.78 26.42 34.34 34.92 26.35 34.12 31.19 34.64
Notes: Calculated based on balanced panel of 418 individuals.
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26Table 3: Summary statistics
Mean Standard Deviation
Transitions out of employment 0.012 [0.109]
Employment duration 0-6 months DD : 0 ¡ 6 0.189 [0.392]
Employment duration 7-12 months DD : 7 ¡ 12 0.134 [0.341]
Employment duration 13-36 months DD : 13 ¡ 36 0.281 [0.450]
Employment duration 37-96 months DD : 37 ¡ 96 0.295 [0.456]
Employment duration >=97 months DD :>= 97 0.101 [0.301]
Age AGE 39.718 [10.515]
Gender MALE : Y es 0.736 [0.441]
Respondent has children in HH CHILD : Y es 0.511 [0.500]
Marital Status MARRIED : Y es 0.741 [0.438]
Nationality GERMAN : Y es 0.779 [0.415]
Workplace in East Germany WorkinEast : Y es) 0.174 [0.379]
Hourly Wage HWage 11.637 [5.856]
Wage is missing MissWage 0.089 [0.285]
Firm size <20 employees FS :< 20 0.149 [0.356]
Firm size 21-199 employees FS : 21 ¡ 199 0.284 [0.451]
Firm size 200-1999 employees FS : 200 ¡ 1999 0.314 [0.464]
Firm size >=2000 employees FS :> 2000 0.250 [0.433]
Firm public ownership PUBOWN : Y es 0.010 [0.101]
Occupation: manager,technician,scientist OCC : Manager 0.272 [0.445]
Occupation: clerk OCC : Clerk 0.086 [0.281]
Occupation: service worker OCC : Service 0.016 [0.125]
Occupation: crafts worker OCC : Craft 0.358 [0.479]
Occupation: skilled machine operator OCC : Swork 0.183 [0.387]
Occupation: unskilled worker OCC : Uwork 0.073 [0.261]
High education ED : High 0.138 [0.345]
Medium education ED : Med 0.134 [0.340]
Low education ED : Low 0.729 [0.445]
Regional unemployment UNEMP 9.880 [3.929]
R&D intensity R&D
Y 2.356 [2.846]
Net exports (Exp ¡ Imp) 11.250 [15.796]






Narrow outsourcing OUTSnarrow 5.566 [4.684]
Wide outsourcing OUTSwide 12.184 [5.870]
Year Dummies Y ear = 1991 0.114 [0.318]
Y ear = 1992 0.105 [0.307]
Y ear = 1993 0.095 [0.294]
Y ear = 1994 0.093 [0.290]
Y ear = 1995 0.096 [0.294]
Y ear = 1996 0.089 [0.284]
Y ear = 1997 0.086 [0.280]
Y ear = 1998 0.093 [0.290]
Y ear = 1999 0.091 [0.287]
Y ear = 2000 0.139 [0.346]
Observations 213750
27Table 4: Hazard Rate Model - Narrow Outsourcing
I II III IV
DD : 0 ¡ 6 3.659 [0.218]*** 2.726 [0.237]*** 2.841 [0.236]*** 2.761 [0.238]***
DD : 7 ¡ 12 2.341 [0.226]*** 2.047 [0.243]*** 2.138 [0.243]*** 2.072 [0.243]***
DD : 13 ¡ 36 1.431 [0.226]*** 1.323 [0.242]*** 1.391 [0.241]*** 1.340 [0.242]***
DD : 37 ¡ 96 0.995 [0.230]*** 1.127 [0.244]*** 1.149 [0.244]*** 1.116 [0.245]***
AGE 0.003 [0.016] -0.023 [0.021] -0.038 [0.021]* -0.060 [0.022]***
AGE2=100 0.038 [0.019]** 0.054 [0.026]** 0.071 [0.025]*** 0.105 [0.027]***
MALE : Y es -0.342 [0.096]*** -0.849 [0.138]*** -0.823 [0.136]*** -0.766 [0.139]***
CHILD : Y es 0.218 [0.091]** -0.036 [0.110] -0.037 [0.109] -0.007 [0.110]
CHILD : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.682 [0.101]*** 0.585 [0.129]*** 0.698 [0.129]*** 0.683 [0.132]***
MARRIED : Y es -0.456 [0.097]*** -0.399 [0.123]*** -0.403 [0.122]*** -0.353 [0.124]***
MARRIED : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.940 [0.112]*** 0.731 [0.147]*** 0.878 [0.142]*** 0.848 [0.147]***
GERMAN : Y es 0.371 [0.061]*** -0.029 [0.085] -0.045 [0.084] -0.100 [0.088]
WorkinEast : Y es -0.298 [0.148]** -0.121 [0.173] -0.058 [0.168] -0.165 [0.173]
Hourly Wage -0.049 [0.006]*** -0.052 [0.008]*** -0.049 [0.008]***
Wage is missing -0.258 [0.081]*** -0.393 [0.096]*** -0.381 [0.100]***
FS :< 20 0.258 [0.076]*** 0.192 [0.096]** 0.173 [0.092]* 0.015 [0.101]
FS : 21 ¡ 199 0.075 [0.073] 0.230 [0.094]** 0.215 [0.090]** 0.120 [0.092]
FS : 200 ¡ 1999 0.093 [0.073] 0.137 [0.090] 0.043 [0.090] -0.062 [0.091]
PUBOWN : Y es -0.079 [0.218] 0.269 [0.255] 0.334 [0.254] 0.229 [0.255]
OCC : Manager -0.413 [0.074]*** -0.072 [0.094] -0.165 [0.092]* -0.117 [0.097]
OCC : Clerk -0.068 [0.070] -0.171 [0.087]** -0.189 [0.083]** -0.058 [0.090]
OCC : Service -0.141 [0.098] 0.002 [0.133] -0.037 [0.125] -0.038 [0.138]
OCC : Craft -0.399 [0.071]*** -0.305 [0.084]*** -0.331 [0.084]*** -0.206 [0.091]**
OCC : Swork -0.282 [0.073]*** -0.049 [0.089] -0.021 [0.090] -0.023 [0.101]
ED : High -0.323 [0.093]*** -0.236 [0.123]* -0.337 [0.123]*** -0.082 [0.192]
ED : Med -0.155 [0.071]** 0.000 [0.117] -0.184 [0.106]* -0.159 [0.141]
UNEMP -0.033 [0.031] 0.055 [0.027]** 0.046 [0.027]* 0.057 [0.028]**
R&D=Y 0.173 [0.060]*** 0.140 [0.067]** 0.180 [0.068]***
R&D=Y ¤ ED : High 0.126 [0.084]
R&D=Y ¤ ED : Med 0.167 [0.079]**
R&D=Y ¤ ED : Low 0.207 [0.069]***
(Exp ¡ Imp) 0.023 [0.014]* 0.025 [0.016] 0.024 [0.016] 0.018 [0.016]
Y ¤ 10¡3 -0.012 [0.006]* -0.012 [0.007]* -0.008 [0.007] -0.007 [0.007]
Equip=Y 0.033 [0.020] 0.028 [0.023] 0.021 [0.023] 0.024 [0.023]
Plant=Y -0.106 [0.029]*** -0.058 [0.034]* -0.053 [0.034] -0.049 [0.035]
OUT 0.059 [0.021]*** 0.054 [0.023]** 0.053 [0.023]**
OUT ¤ ED : High 0.066 [0.036]*
OUT ¤ ED : Med 0.096 [0.033]***
OUT ¤ ED : Low 0.053 [0.025]**
Y ear = 1992 1.270 [0.111]*** 0.929 [0.118]*** 0.940 [0.121]*** 0.917 [0.118]***
Y ear = 1993 1.258 [0.147]*** 0.819 [0.153]*** 0.867 [0.156]*** 0.822 [0.153]***
Y ear = 1994 1.199 [0.166]*** 0.704 [0.169]*** 0.752 [0.172]*** 0.690 [0.170]***
Y ear = 1995 1.230 [0.162]*** 0.739 [0.165]*** 0.824 [0.168]*** 0.748 [0.168]***
Y ear = 1996 1.412 [0.183]*** 0.775 [0.182]*** 0.844 [0.185]*** 0.798 [0.185]***
Y ear = 1997 1.465 [0.207]*** 0.800 [0.201]*** 0.857 [0.204]*** 0.808 [0.204]***
Y ear = 1998 1.238 [0.195]*** 0.673 [0.192]*** 0.704 [0.196]*** 0.653 [0.196]***
Y ear = 1999 1.365 [0.181]*** 0.846 [0.181]*** 0.895 [0.184]*** 0.816 [0.183]***
Y ear = 2000 1.297 [0.163]*** 0.832 [0.175]*** 0.851 [0.177]*** 0.847 [0.178]***
Constant = ²m=1
i -5.649 [1.235]*** -7.124 [1.400]*** -7.657 [1.388]*** -7.203 [1.375]***
P(²m=1
i ) 0.686 [0.263] 0.693 [0.294] 0.734 [0.107]
²m=2
i -2.660 [1.417]* -2.719 [1.399]* -3.981 [1.369]***
P(²m=2
i ) 0.003 [0.001] 0.002 [0.001] 0.141 [0.021]
Constant = ²m=3
i -5.174 [1.400]*** -5.631 [1.400]*** -2.145 [1.396]
P(²m=3
i ) 0.141 [0.054] 0.128 [0.054] 0.001 [0.000]
²m=4
i -3.854 [1.390]*** -4.361 [1.373]*** -4.810 [1.378]***
P(²m=4
i ) 0.170 [0.016] 0.177 [0.017] 0.123 [0.025]
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -9844.67 -9028.67 -9048.63 -9027.62





LR Test, Pooled vs. interacted model:Â2(4) 2.10
p-value 0.72
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ¤ signi¯cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
Default categories:DD :> 97, FS :>= 2000, OCC : Uwork, ED : Low
28Table 5: Hazard Rate Model - Wide Outsourcing
I II
DD : 0 ¡ 6 2.726 [0.238]*** 2.742 [0.238]***
DD : 7 ¡ 12 2.046 [0.243]*** 2.067 [0.244]***
DD : 13 ¡ 36 1.323 [0.242]*** 1.345 [0.243]***
DD : 37 ¡ 96 1.126 [0.244]*** 1.146 [0.245]***
AGE -0.025 [0.022] -0.021 [0.021]
AGE2=100 0.057 [0.026]** 0.053 [0.026]**
MALE : Y es -0.850 [0.138]*** -0.887 [0.140]***
CHILD : Y es -0.035 [0.111] -0.032 [0.112]
CHILD : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.584 [0.129]*** 0.585 [0.130]***
MARRIED : Y es -0.402 [0.123]*** -0.404 [0.124]***
MARRIED : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.731 [0.148]*** 0.678 [0.150]***
GERMAN : Y es -0.029 [0.085] -0.056 [0.088]
WorkinEast : Y es -0.117 [0.173] -0.120 [0.173]
Hourly Wage -0.052 [0.008]*** -0.054 [0.008]***
Wage is missing -0.390 [0.096]*** -0.388 [0.095]***
FS :< 20 0.199 [0.096]** 0.173 [0.097]*
FS : 21 ¡ 199 0.231 [0.094]** 0.183 [0.093]*
FS : 200 ¡ 1999 0.139 [0.090] 0.111 [0.091]
PUBOWN : Y es 0.280 [0.255] 0.353 [0.263]
OCC : Manager -0.075 [0.095] -0.065 [0.096]
OCC : Clerk -0.173 [0.087]* -0.199 [0.088]**
OCC : Service -0.010 [0.133] -0.044 [0.130]
OCC : Craft -0.307 [0.084]*** -0.297 [0.084]***
OCC : Swork -0.055 [0.089] -0.070 [0.089]
ED : High -0.232 [0.123]* -0.282 [0.268]
ED : Med -0.003 [0.121] -0.811 [0.213]***
UNEMP 0.054 [0.027]* 0.054 [0.027]*
R&D=Y 0.117 [0.067]*
R&D=Y ¤ ED : High 0.060 [0.078]
R&D=Y ¤ ED : Med 0.158 [0.075]**
R&D=Y ¤ ED : Low 0.114 [0.067]*
(Exp ¡ Imp) 0.025 [0.016] 0.028 [0.016]*
Y ¤ 10¡3 -0.013 [0.007]* -0.014 [0.007]*
Equip=Y 0.026 [0.023] 0.030 [0.023]
Plant=Y -0.057 [0.036] -0.062 [0.036]*
OUT 0.021 [0.018]
OUT ¤ ED : High 0.032 [0.026]
OUT ¤ ED : Med 0.064 [0.024]**
OUT ¤ ED : Low 0.019 [0.018]
Y ear = 1992 0.939 [0.119]*** 0.935 [0.119]***
Y ear = 1993 0.840 [0.153]*** 0.834 [0.151]***
Y ear = 1994 0.739 [0.169]*** 0.727 [0.169]***
Y ear = 1995 0.781 [0.168]*** 0.794 [0.168]***
Y ear = 1996 0.821 [0.182]*** 0.822 [0.183]***
Y ear = 1997 0.850 [0.201]*** 0.839 [0.202]***
Y ear = 1998 0.733 [0.195]*** 0.723 [0.196]***
Y ear = 1999 0.899 [0.186]*** 0.890 [0.187]***
Y ear = 2000 0.891 [0.187]*** 0.867 [0.187]***
Constant = ²m=1
i -6.998 [1.416]*** -6.857 [1.422]***
P(²m=1
i ) 0.686 [0.263] 0.687 [0.235]
²m=2
i -2.531 [1.431]* -2.437 [1.434]*
P(²m=2
i ) 0.003 [0.001] 0.004 [0.001]
Constant = ²m=3
i -5.050 [1.415]*** -4.942 [1.420]***
P(²m=3
i ) 0.142 [0.054] 0.137 [0.047]
²m=4
i -3.728 [1.405]*** -3.592 [1.409]**
P(²m=4
i ) 0.169 [0.017] 0.172 [0.016]
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes




Waldtest: R&D/Y*ED:High,MED,LOW equal:Â2(2) 3.500
p-value 0.174
LR Test, Pooled vs. interacted model:Â2(4) 7.492
p-value 0.112
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ¤ signi¯cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
Default categories:DD :> 97, FS :>= 2000, OCC : Uwork, ED : Low
29Table 6: Hazard Rate Model - Narrow Outsourcing interacted with duration
I II
DD : 0 ¡ 6 3.931 [0.340]*** 3.173 [0.359]***
DD : 7 ¡ 12 2.793 [0.352]*** 2.514 [0.370]***
DD : 13 ¡ 36 1.596 [0.351]*** 1.592 [0.369]***
DD : 37 ¡ 96 1.263 [0.358]*** 1.427 [0.373]***
AGE -0.005 [0.015] -0.022 [0.021]
AGE2=100 0.049 [0.019]*** 0.053 [0.026]**
MALE : Y es -0.347 [0.096]*** -0.851 [0.138]***
CHILD : Y es 0.231 [0.091]** -0.032 [0.110]
CHILD : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.667 [0.101]*** 0.569 [0.129]***
MARRIED : Y es -0.460 [0.096]*** -0.405 [0.123]***
MARRIED : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.960 [0.112]*** 0.741 [0.147]***
GERMAN : Y es 0.362 [0.061]*** -0.033 [0.085]
WorkinEast : Y es -0.641 [0.099]*** -0.125 [0.173]
Wage -0.046 [0.006]*** -0.053 [0.008]***
Wageismissing -0.238 [0.080]*** -0.406 [0.096]***
FS :< 20 0.241 [0.076]*** 0.201 [0.096]**
FS : 21 ¡ 199 0.043 [0.073] 0.233 [0.094]**
FS : 200 ¡ 1999 0.081 [0.073] 0.137 [0.090]
PUBOWN : Y es -0.067 [0.218] 0.283 [0.254]
OCC : Manager -0.429 [0.074]*** -0.076 [0.094]
OCC : Clerk -0.097 [0.070] -0.171 [0.087]**
OCC : Service -0.117 [0.098] 0.004 [0.133]
OCC : Craft -0.417 [0.070]*** -0.305 [0.084]***
OCC : Swork -0.266 [0.073]*** -0.042 [0.089]
ED : High -0.325 [0.093]*** -0.233 [0.123]*
ED : Med -0.127 [0.071]* 0.008 [0.115]
UNEMP -0.037 [0.010]*** 0.055 [0.027]**
R&D=Y 0.159 [0.060]*** 0.154 [0.067]**
(Exp ¡ Imp) 0.025 [0.014]* 0.023 [0.016]
Y ¤ 10¡3 -0.013 [0.006]** -0.012 [0.007]*
Equip=Y 0.032 [0.020] 0.026 [0.023]
Plant=Y -0.106 [0.029]*** -0.054 [0.034]
OUT ¤ DD : 0 ¡ 6 0.069 [0.021]*** 0.047 [0.024]**
OUT ¤ DD : 7 ¡ 12 0.032 [0.026] 0.043 [0.029]
OUT ¤ DD : 13 ¡ 36 0.087 [0.025]*** 0.081 [0.028]***
OUT ¤ DD : 37 ¡ 96 0.066 [0.025]*** 0.074 [0.028]***
OUT ¤ DD :>= 97 0.102 [0.038]*** 0.115 [0.041]***
Y ear = 1992 1.285 [0.106]*** 0.937 [0.118]***
Y ear = 1993 1.273 [0.124]*** 0.828 [0.153]***
Y ear = 1994 1.207 [0.128]*** 0.715 [0.169]***
Y ear = 1995 1.255 [0.126]*** 0.745 [0.165]***
Y ear = 1996 1.441 [0.129]*** 0.786 [0.182]***
Y ear = 1997 1.487 [0.134]*** 0.815 [0.201]***
Y ear = 1998 1.249 [0.133]*** 0.685 [0.193]***
Y ear = 1999 1.376 [0.132]*** 0.859 [0.181]***
Y ear = 2000 1.300 [0.136]*** 0.854 [0.175]***
Constant = ²m=1
i -5.656 [1.181]*** -7.645 [1.425]***
P(²m=1












i ) 0.171 [0.017]
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes
Log likelihood -9877.75 -9024.33
Observations 231750 231750
Waldtest:OUT*DD equal, Chi2(4) 9.090 9.000
p-value 0.059 0.061
LR Test, Pooled vs. interacted model : Chi2(4) - 8.690
p-value - 0.069
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ¤ signi¯cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
Default categories:DD :> 97,FS :>= 2000,OCC : Uwork,ED : Low
30Table 7: Bootstrapped Standard Errors
Full model Simple model Bootstrapped SE
DD : 0 ¡ 6 2.726 [0.237]*** 3.659 [0.218]*** [0.215]***
DD : 7 ¡ 12 2.047 [0.243]*** 2.341 [0.226]*** [0.221]***
DD : 13 ¡ 36 1.323 [0.242]*** 1.431 [0.226]*** [0.220]***
DD : 37 ¡ 96 1.127 [0.244]*** 0.995 [0.230]*** [0.230]***
AGE -0.023 [0.021] 0.003 [0.016] [0.016]
AGE2=100 0.054 [0.026]** 0.038 [0.019]** [0.000]**
MALE : Y es -0.849 [0.138]*** -0.342 [0.096]*** [0.093]***
CHILD : Y es -0.036 [0.110] 0.218 [0.091]** [0.095]**
CHILD : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.585 [0.129]*** 0.682 [0.101]*** [0.108]***
MARRIED : Y es -0.399 [0.123]*** -0.456 [0.097]*** [0.099]***
MARRIED : Y es ¤ FEMALE 0.731 [0.147]*** 0.940 [0.112]*** [0.115]***
GERMAN : Y es -0.029 [0.085] 0.371 [0.061]*** [0.067]***
WorkinEast : Y es -0.121 [0.173] -0.298 [0.148]** [0.180]*
Wage -0.052 [0.008]*** -0.049 [0.006]*** [0.007]***
Wageismissing -0.393 [0.096]*** -0.258 [0.081]*** [0.090]***
FS :< 20 0.192 [0.096]** 0.258 [0.076]*** [0.078]***
FS : 21 ¡ 199 0.230 [0.094]** 0.075 [0.073] [0.077]
FS : 200 ¡ 1999 0.137 [0.090] 0.093 [0.073] [0.073]
PUBOWN : Y es 0.269 [0.255] -0.079 [0.218] [0.251]
OCC : Manager -0.072 [0.094] -0.413 [0.074]*** [0.078]***
OCC : Clerk -0.171 [0.087]** -0.068 [0.070] [0.078]
OCC : Service 0.002 [0.133] -0.141 [0.098] [0.105]
OCC : Craft -0.305 [0.084]*** -0.399 [0.071]*** [0.078]***
OCC : Swork -0.049 [0.089] -0.282 [0.073]*** [0.079]***
ED : High -0.236 [0.123]* -0.323 [0.093]*** [0.100]***
ED : Med 0.000 [0.117] -0.155 [0.071]** [0.078]**
UNEMP 0.055 [0.027]** -0.033 [0.031] [0.032]
R&D=Y 0.140 [0.067]** 0.173 [0.060]*** [0.059]***
(Exp ¡ Imp) 0.025 [0.016] 0.023 [0.014]* [0.014]
Y ¤ 10¡3 -0.012 [0.007]* -0.012 [0.006]* [0.006]*
Equip=Y 0.028 [0.023] 0.033 [0.020] [0.021]
Plant=Y -0.058 [0.034]* -0.106 [0.029]*** [0.030]***
OUT 0.054 [0.023]** 0.059 [0.021]*** [0.023]**
Y ear = 1992 0.929 [0.118]*** 1.270 [0.111]*** [0.121]***
Y ear = 1993 0.819 [0.153]*** 1.258 [0.147]*** [0.161]***
Y ear = 1994 0.704 [0.169]*** 1.199 [0.166]*** [0.178]***
Y ear = 1995 0.739 [0.165]*** 1.230 [0.162]*** [0.176]***
Y ear = 1996 0.775 [0.182]*** 1.412 [0.183]*** [0.197]***
Y ear = 1997 0.800 [0.201]*** 1.465 [0.207]*** [0.224]***
Y ear = 1998 0.673 [0.192]*** 1.238 [0.195]*** [0.212]***
Y ear = 1999 0.846 [0.181]*** 1.365 [0.181]*** [0.192]***
Y ear = 2000 0.832 [0.175]*** 1.297 [0.163]*** [0.174]***
Constant = ²m=1
i -7.124 [1.400]*** -5.649 [1.235]*** [1.020]***
P(²m=1












i ) 0.170 [0.016]
Industry Dummies Yes Yes
Region Dummies Yes Yes
Log likelihood -9028.67 -9844.67
Observations 213750 213750
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses, ¤ signi¯cant at 10%, ¤¤ at 5%, ¤¤¤ at1%
Default categories:DD :> 97,FS :>= 2000,OCC : Uwork,ED : Low
31